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Abstract 
 
Jennifer Kirstin Benz:  A Framework for Understanding the Role of Self-Interest in 
Attitude Formation 
(Under the direction of Thomas Carsey) 
 
In this paper I present a framework based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
persuasion to explain the interplay of self-interest with symbolic beliefs and sociotropic 
perceptions in determining policy preferences.  In developing the self-interest framework, 
I generate three testable hypotheses.  I address two of these hypotheses in this paper using 
individual level survey data on preferences for a system of universal health insurance.  
The results of these tests provide preliminary support for the self-interest framework and 
suggest that a new conception of the effect of self-interest on policy preferences is in 
order.   
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Introduction 
The function of self-interest in political behavior is regularly debated in both the 
normative and empirical literatures.  One important puzzle is the discrepancy between the 
significant role of self-interest in the economic, public policy and normative political 
literatures and its insubstantial role in the political public opinion literature.   The public 
opinion literature has generated two widely cited theories in which symbolic beliefs or 
perceptions of the larger national situation are more predictive than self-interest in 
determining policy and electoral preferences.  Individual empirical tests generate support 
for both of these theories, but the accumulated body of evidence demonstrates that the 
theories are conditional upon individual and contextual factors.  The result is an unclear 
understanding of the basic structure of public policy attitudes.  In this paper, I present a 
framework for understanding the determinants of public policy preferences that 
highlights the interplay of self-interest with symbolic beliefs and perceptions of the 
national situation for important public policy issues.  Tests of the theory show when and 
how self-interest becomes a significant predictor of public policy attitudes. 
Despite the theoretical disagreement about the determinants of public policy 
preferences, aggregate public opinion is a proven influence on the policy process in the 
United States.  A considerable body of evidence finds that the public’s preferences have 
important effects on electoral and public policy outcomes (Page and Shapiro 1992; 
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson 1999; Kelly 2005; Wlezien 1995).  
 2 
Furthermore, public policy scholars and practitioners observe in real time the 
determinants of public opinion and their consequences on important public policy issues.  
The debate over health care reform provides a clear example.  Experts on health care 
reform policy observe that individual self-interest has a large effect on the public’s 
preferences for large-scale change (Oberlander 2003; Blendon 2006).  Oberlander writes, 
“The insured are generally satisfied with their own medical care, even if they think 
poorly of the system as a whole.  Consequently, the well-insured are not a reliable 
constituency for change.  Indeed, any reform that threatens to alter their medical care 
arrangements is likely to provoke public opposition” (2003).   
Observations like this challenge conventional thinking in political science about 
the determinants of policy attitudes, and most especially, the role of self-interest.  The 
framework I present in this paper provides a way to reconcile the discrepancy between 
the observed effects of self-interest in the policy environment and the inability to find an 
effect of self-interest in the political science literature.  I begin with a brief review of the 
literatures on symbolic beliefs and voting based on perceptions of the national economic 
situation, highlighting the role that self-interest plays in those theories.  I then present the 
self-interest framework and discuss the expectations of the framework for understanding 
attitudes toward public policy issues.  In the next section, I utilize individual level 
opinion data on preferences for a system of national health insurance to test aspects of the 
framework.  I conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications for the role 
of self-interest in politics.   
 
 
  
 
Background 
Early theories of public opinion emphasized the role of self-interest as a major 
determinant of individual preferences.  Campbell et al. (1960) articulate a notion of 
public policy preferences as mere expressions of “primitive self-interest” (Campbell et al 
1960).  Popkin et al. (1976) assert that the influence of economic conditions on electoral 
outcomes results from individuals basing their electoral decisions upon the tangible 
economic situations they face in their daily lives.  The self-interested motivations of these 
“pocketbook voters” served as a central theme in the work on the political economy of 
individuals for several years.  
 Kinder and Kiewiet conducted the first critical investigation of the pocketbook 
voter assumption (1981).  In doing so, they defined the sociotropic voter as an individual 
“influenced most of all by the nation’s economic condition” and not the condition of their 
own pocketbook (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).  They argued that individuals develop rough 
evaluations of the nation’s economic condition and place credit or blame on the 
incumbent government accordingly.  Furthermore, they showed that sociotropic 
perceptions are not simply expressions of ideological or partisan loyalties.  They and 
others showed that sociotropic perceptions are more predictive of vote choice than 
pocketbook considerations (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder 1981; Lewis-
Beck 1988).      
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 Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) expressed an agnostic belief about the motivation 
driving sociotropic effects.  They were clear that sociotropic politics did not necessarily 
imply a politics of altruism.  Sociotropic politics, they believed, could very well be a 
politics of indirect self-interest, but they were unable to adequately test for this 
possibility.  Several scholars have since taken up this issue and the evidence that has 
accumulated suggests that sociotropic politics are not indirect expressions of self-interest.  
Evaluations of group fairness, social value commitments, and beliefs in economic 
individualism seem to moderate the role of self-interest and bolster the effect of 
sociotropic perceptions (Mutz and Mondak1997; Funk 2000; Funk and Garcia-Monet 
1997; Feldman 1982).     
 At about the same time that the sociotropic politics literature was questioning the 
role of self-interest, work by Sears and his colleagues explored the relative contribution 
of self-interested motivations compared to symbolic beliefs about race1, political parties, 
and ideology in predicting policy preferences and political behaviors (Kinder and Sears 
1981; Lau et al. 1978; Sears et al. 1980).  Their studies found little or no effect of self-
interest on policy preferences across a number of domains.  Even when self-interest 
effects were present, their explanatory power compared to symbolic beliefs was quite 
small.  A recent replication and update of the original work confirms the dominant role of 
symbolic beliefs (Lau 2007). 
                                                 
1
 Early work by Sears and colleagues on symbolic racism has been criticized for methodological problems 
such as construct validity and confounding the independent and dependent variables (see Sniderman and 
Tetlock 1986).  Work focusing on the symbolic politics of ideology and partisanship (Sears and Lau 1983; 
Lau 2007) improves upon these methodological problems.  However, the dependent variables often used in 
these analyses ask about preferences for vague policies and are unlikely to tap the concept of tangible self-
interest investigated in this paper.     
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 Overall then, the bulk of the evidence from the sociotropic perceptions and 
symbolic beliefs literatures reduces self-interest to a negligible determinant of policy 
preferences.  However, several studies do find a role for self-interest when examining 
preferences for policies that offer clear benefits or costs (Sears and Citrin 1985; Dixon et 
al. 1991; Wolpert and Gimpel 1998).  Furthermore, survey and laboratory based 
experiments demonstrate that priming self-interest can induce significant self-interest 
effects in policy preferences (Sears and Lau 1983; Chong et al. 2001).  Taken together, 
these results suggest that theories of political attitude determinants should not be so quick 
to dismiss the role of self-interest.  The empirical data imply that the role of self-interest 
is conditional and the evidence to date implies that self-interest is most likely to have an 
impact on attitudes when an individual is aware of his or her self-interest and when the 
implications of the policy options for the individual are clear.  However the literature 
lacks any theoretical justification for these findings.           
 The conditional nature of self-interest can potentially be explained using models 
of attitude formation available in the social psychology literature.  The Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion is of particular relevance to understanding the 
roles of self-interest, sociotropic perceptions, and symbolic beliefs.  The ELM begins 
with the premise that individuals want to hold correct attitudes2 (Festinger 1950).  
Attitudes are defined in the ELM as “general evaluations people hold in regard to 
themselves, other people, objects, and issues” (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  The attitudes 
can be based on behavioral, affective, and/or cognitive experiences, and have the 
                                                 
2
 Individuals are motivated to hold attitudes that are adaptive and lead to positive behavioral, affective, and 
cognitive consequences.  Festinger’s Social Comparison process (1954) explains how individuals 
determine the correctness of their attitudes by comparing them to the attitudes of others.     
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potential to influence behavioral, affective and cognitive processes in the future (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1986).   
The Elaboration Likelihood Model puts forth two routes that individuals might 
take when forming an attitude (Petty and Cacioppo 1981).  Individuals who are both 
motivated and able to cognitively process information relevant to the attitude are likely to 
take the central route to forming attitudes, which involves more cognitive processing and 
leads to relatively accessible and stable attitudes (Petty et al. 1995).  These individuals 
are said to have high elaboration likelihood.   High elaboration indicates a process in 
which individuals carefully attend to issue messages, access relevant information from 
memory, elaborate upon the message using the information from memory, and form an 
attitude based on this analysis (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  Individuals lacking the 
motivation or ability to process information are likely to take the peripheral route to 
forming an attitude, such that they rely on simple cues and heuristics rather than 
cognitive processing.  These individuals are said to have low elaboration likelihood as 
they do not attend carefully to the message or undergo a process of accessing relevant 
information from memory3.         
One feature of the Elaboration Likelihood Model that will help inform the self-
interest framework I present in the next section is that pieces of information and cues can 
serve multiple roles for individuals4.  A common example used in the literature is an ad 
                                                 
3
 Though not pertinent to the present study, it should be noted that individuals who rely exclusively on cues 
or who engage fully in cognitive processing occupy the endpoints of the elaboration likelihood continuum.  
Most individuals fall somewhere along the continuum such that they utilize both arguments and cues to 
form their opinions.  However, it is possible to discriminate between attitude formation that results 
primarily from the peripheral route and attitudes formed using the central route.  Although important to 
understand the underlying continuum, most research considers the processes operating at the endpoints 
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
 
 7 
that shows a picturesque view of a sandy beach.  In an advertisement for a hotel in 
Hawaii, this picture serves as relevant information for cognitive processing in the central 
route because it supplies information on the benefits of the hotel.  The same scene 
appearing in an advertisement for a car serves only as a peripheral cue because it does not 
provide any relevant information about the qualities of the car (Staats and Staats 1957).  
In other words, a piece of information can serve as a cognitive argument or as a 
peripheral cue depending on the context.  As the self-interest framework is presented, it 
will be important to remember that cues in the political environment can influence both 
central route and peripheral route processors.           
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 In addition to serving as arguments or cues, a piece of information can also affect attitude formation by 
determining whether message processing occurs objectively or with a bias.  In biased processing, a piece of 
information can influence individuals to generate a specific type of thought, or to inhibit a specific type of 
thought (Petty and Cacioppo 1981).  Biased processing under the ELM shares many features with models 
of Motivated Reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2000) and Bayesian updating (Bartels 2002).   
  
 
A Framework for Understanding the Role of Self-Interest 
In this section, I build on the existing literature to present a framework for 
understanding when and how self-interest becomes an important determinant of policy 
preferences in the political environment.  The political environment provides individuals 
with a large amount of information they can use to form policy preferences.  Each of 
these pieces of information can be considered as either an argument or a peripheral cue 
depending on the degree to which individuals rely on cognitive processing to form their 
preferences. Included among the different types of information available are: 
• Descriptions of the current national condition that serve to frame the policy 
problem (sociotropic considerations). 
• Arguments about the merits and consequences of policy options for different 
groups of individuals (self-interested considerations). 
• Endorsements of policy options by politicians and political parties (symbolic 
considerations). 
• Policy frames that connect the policy to broader ideological values (symbolic 
considerations). 
 
 Recall that individuals are likely to engage in central route processing when they 
are able and motivated to think about the issue (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  Research on 
the ELM finds that personal relevance, which occurs when an issue has significant 
consequences for the individual, motivates individuals to engage in central route 
processing (Petty and Cacioppo 1979).  In the realm of political decision making, I 
propose that self-interest serves as a source of motivation5.  Self-interest suggests that the 
                                                 
5
 Individuals can be motivated to use central route processing for several reasons.  In addition to the 
motivation of self-interest (i.e. personal relevance) discussed in this paper, another well researched 
motivation is an individual’s need for cognition.  Individuals high in need for cognition (NFC) enjoy 
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issue carries significant consequences for the individual.  As self-interest increases, 
people will become more motivated to cognitively process the issue information available 
in the political environment.  The intrinsic consequences of the issue motivate self-
interested individuals to form a correct attitude because the costs of holding an incorrect 
attitude are large.  Individuals with a clear stake in a policy outcome are therefore more 
likely to engage in central route processing as they form their attitudes.  This is the first 
role of self-interest as a determinant of public policy preferences.   
 Once they are cognitively engaged, individuals with a self-interested stake in the 
policy outcome will be more likely to consider the sociotropic and symbolic 
considerations available in the political environment as informational arguments6.  
Compare this to individuals lacking a self-interested motive in the policy outcome who 
are likely to rely on the sociotropic and symbolic considerations as simple cues to form 
their preferences.  The second role of self-interest, therefore, is to moderate the influence 
of sociotropic and symbolic considerations.  Under this framework the influence of self-
interest on sociotropic perceptions and symbolic beliefs to determine policy preferences 
will differ depending on the importance of the policy issue for the individual.   
                                                                                                                                                 
engaging in effortful and analytic thinking (Cacioppo and Petty 1982).  Need for cognition is an individual 
difference variable that is rarely measured in political surveys.  Although not a direct proxy for NFC 
(Cacioppo et al. 1996), an individual’s education is controlled for in all analyses presented here.     
 
6
 Petty and Cacioppo find that central route processors are better able to distinguish between strong and 
weak arguments compared to peripheral route processors (1986).  Party identifiers are likely to consider 
arguments from their own party as strong and to disregard information from the other party (Druckman 
2004). Party identifiers engaged in central route processing should therefore view party messages as strong 
arguments.  Party identifiers engaged in peripheral processing should not make a distinction about 
argument quality, but simply accept the party message as a cue.  Determining the quality of sociotropic 
arguments is less straightforward.  Objectively, the political environment is likely to supply some strong 
and some weak sociotropic arguments.  Individuals processing centrally should be able to distinguish the 
argument quality, and are likely to form their overall sociotropic perception based only on the strong 
arguments in the environment.  Peripheral route processors are likely to use the number of sociotropic 
arguments available in the environment as a cue about the severity of the policy problem. 
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 The framework generates three hypotheses about the role of self-interest as a 
determinant of policy preferences.  First, I expect individuals with a narrow self-interest 
in a policy outcome to engage in behaviors consistent with attitude formation under the 
central processing route of the Elaboration Likelihood Model.  Self-interested individuals 
should be more likely to engage in the types of information processing behaviors 
consistent with central route processing.  These behaviors include, but are not limited to, 
the ability to distinguish between strong and weak arguments in the face of peripheral 
cues such as source expertise and varying the number of arguments.  The attitudes 
formed by self-interested individuals, like all central route processors, should 
demonstrate the characteristics of strong attitudes indicative of preferences formed using 
the central route such as greater persistence and increased ability for the attitude to 
predict behavior (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  This hypothesis is not tested in this paper.   
Second, I expect the effects of self-interest to be significant whenever the policy 
outcomes and consequences are clear because self-interested individuals will be 
motivated to form the correct attitude given the appreciable costs of forming an incorrect 
attitude.  Phrased in the negative, self-interest is unlikely to have a significant effect for 
policies that lack tangible benefits or costs.  A significant effect of self-interest should 
remain even when controlling for symbolic beliefs and sociotropic perceptions.       
Third, self-interest should moderate the effects of sociotropic perceptions and 
symbolic beliefs.  Individuals with an interest in a policy will be more likely to elaborate 
on the information about the policy available in the political environment.  Self-interested 
individuals will therefore relate the information about the policy from the political parties 
and political commentary to their knowledge about their own interests.  Because the costs 
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of forming an attitude against one’s own interests are greater than forming an attitude 
against one’s symbolic beliefs or sociotropic perceptions, the self-interest framework 
expects no significant differences among individuals with a tangible interest in a policy 
regardless of their symbolic beliefs or sociotropic perceptions7.  Individuals without a 
tangible interest in a policy will not be motivated to elaborate on the information 
available in the political environment and will therefore rely on symbolic beliefs and 
sociotropic perceptions as cues to form their attitudes.  As a result, the self-interest 
framework expects significant differences based upon symbolic beliefs and sociotropic 
perceptions to exist among individuals without a tangible interest in the policy.   
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between self-interest and a symbolic belief, party 
identification, for a hypothetical policy8.  The second hypothesis of the self-interest 
framework predicts that, overall, self-interested individuals will support the policy more 
than individuals without an interest.  Furthermore, the situation pictured is one in which 
self-interested individuals and Democrats tend to support the policy.  In this situation, the 
third hypothesis of the self-interest framework predicts no significant difference among 
self-interested Democrats and Republicans and a significant difference between 
Democrats and Republicans without an interest in the policy.  Additionally, the nearly 
flat slope of the Democrats’ line predicted by the third hypothesis of the framework 
                                                 
7
 Cacioppo and Petty find the potential for an individual’s self-interest to reach such a high level that it 
biases the processing of information (1979).  It is therefore conceivable that an individual’s interest in a 
policy can increase to a point at which the individual is so motivated to advance his interest, he will no 
longer behave as a central route processor attending to all information in the environment, and will instead 
reject any information that does not support his interest. 
 
8
 Party identification is treated as a symbolic belief in the symbolic politics literature (for example Sears et 
al. 1980).  This assumes a conception of party affiliation as a psychological identity (Campbell et al. 1960).  
A concept of party affiliation as an instrumental tally (Fiorina 1981), is not likely to yield the same effect.  
Although the nature of partisanship is still open to debate, many scholars believe that each of these 
explanations is true for some individuals and not for others (Erikson et al. 2002).   
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means that no significant differences exist among Democrats regardless of self-interest, 
but self-interested Republicans should differ from Republicans without an interest in the 
policy.  
 
Figure 1: Expected Interaction of Self-Interest and Symbolic Beliefs 
Self-interested individuals and Democrats are for the policy. 
 
 
 
Republicans 
Democrats 
Support 
Against 
Low Self-Interest High Self-Interest 
  
 
Data and Methods 
In this paper, I test the expectations that self-interest will have an effect for 
policies with tangible individual outcomes, and that self-interest will moderate the effects 
of sociotropic perceptions and symbolic beliefs using multivariate regression techniques 
with national survey data.  I use the health care reform case, specifically preferences for a 
system of universal health insurance, as an example of a policy with tangible policy 
consequences.   
The use of survey data requires the researcher to make a decision about the self-
interest of an individual respondent or category of people.  My selection of the universal 
health insurance policy is intended to minimize the error associated with that judgment.  
Being uninsured in this country creates a number of tangible effects including fragmented 
health care, delayed treatments, failed detection of preventable diseases, and increased 
financial instability9.  Policies that guarantee health care coverage provide tangible 
benefits for the medically uninsured.   
At the same time, the provision of universal health care coverage invokes 
sociotropic and symbolic considerations as well.  When questioned about the status of the 
U.S. health care system, individuals’ opinions are generally fairly negative to begin 
                                                 
9
 Reports from the Institute of Medicine develop and discuss these implications more fully.  Institute of 
Medicine (IOM). 2003. A Shared Destiny: Community Effects of Uninsurance. Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press See also, http://covertheuninsuredweek.org/factsheets/display.php?FactSheetID=116, 
accessed November 2, 2007.   
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with10, and much of the debate over a system of universal coverage revolves around the 
chance that the reform could further lessen the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the 
system.  Symbolic beliefs about a system of universal coverage are embodied in the 
rhetoric of socialism and big government that is consistently present in the elite debate 
over the policy.  As such, preferences for a system of universal health insurance provide a 
reasonable test of the self-interest framework.  
To operationalize these concepts for testing the self-interest framework theory, I 
utilize data from a September 2006 ABC News/Kaiser/USA Today national survey of 
adults about health care issues archived at the Roper Center11.  The dependent variable in 
this analysis is a dichotomous choice between a preference for the current health 
insurance system or a universal insurance program (exact question wordings are included 
in Appendix A).  Fifty eight percent of the sample stated a preference for a system of 
universal health insurance.  Self-interest, the key independent variable, is operationalized 
as having some form of health insurance or health care coverage.  Only nine percent of 
the sample reports lacking any form of health coverage.  According to the Current 
Population Survey in 2005, nearly sixteen percent of the U.S. population lacks any form 
of health care coverage.  Underreporting in the survey is likely due to the correlation 
                                                 
10
 In a 2006 ABC News/Kaiser/USA Today poll, 82 percent of respondents were somewhat or very 
dissatisfied with the total cost of health care in the U.S., 54 percent were dissatisfied with the quality of 
health care in the U.S., and 90 percent perceived the number of Americans with no health insurance to be a 
serious or critical problem for the country.   
 
11
 Kaiser Family Foundation and USA Today. ABC News/Kaiser/USA Today Poll # 2006-1021:  
Health Care Costs and Issues [computer file]. 1st Roper Center for Public Opinion Research version. 
Storrs, CT: The Roper Center, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2006. 
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between the uninsured population and populations difficult to contact in telephone 
surveys12.   
Symbolic beliefs include self-identification as a Democrat, Republican, or 
Independent and identification as a liberal, conservative, or moderate.  Thirty nine 
percent of the population reports affiliation with the Democrats, thirty one percent with 
the Republicans, and thirty percent with Independents.  Sociotropic perceptions are 
operationalized using a question that asks respondents to classify the number of 
Americans without any form of health insurance as a critical problem (55%), a serious 
problem (35%), a problem that is not serious (7%), or not a problem (4%).   
To test the hypothesis that self-interest moderates symbolic beliefs, I form 
interaction terms between health insurance status and the pair of party affiliation 
variables representing Democrats and Republicans.  The omitted baseline category is for 
independents.  Party identification is selected as the symbolic belief because the parties 
have public stances on the issue of universal health care insurance.  Because the universal 
coverage issue has not been debated in terms of ideology or race as frequently as the 
partisan debate, interactions with these symbolic beliefs are not considered here.  The 
self-interest framework predicts that self-interest moderates sociotropic perceptions as 
well.  However, due to small sample sizes among the uninsured who perceive the number 
of Americans without health insurance to be a non-problem or a minor problem, I was 
unable to include the interaction term.  The main effect for sociotropic perceptions 
remains in the model.  To reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I include controls for 
                                                 
12
 The uninsured are more likely to be low-income, young, and disproportionately non-citizens.  For 
additional information on the demographics of  the uninsured population, see ASPE Issue Brief.  2005.  
Overview of the Uninsured in the United States: An analysis of the 2005 Current Population Survey.  
Available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/05/uninsured-cps/index.htm#Insurance>.    
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education, gender, race, and income.  These variables are not discussed in the analysis, 
but it should be noted that the only demographic variable that is consistently significant is 
income which demonstrates an expected negative relationship with support for universal 
coverage.   
 
 
 
  
 
Results 
To test the self-interest framework hypotheses, I estimate a logit model with a 
preference for a system of universal health insurance as the dependent variable.  I present 
the results of the self-interest framework model in the right hand column of Table 1.  
Also included in the left column of Table 1, for comparison purposes, are the estimates 
predicted using a traditional symbolic politics model.  The symbolic politics model 
behaves as expected with significant and positive coefficients on the Democrat and 
liberal terms and negative and significant coefficients on the Republican and conservative 
terms.  Joint Wald hypothesis tests confirm that Democrats and Republicans are 
significantly different from one another, as are liberals and conservatives13.  Of note is 
the highly significant and negative sign on the insured term meaning that insured 
individuals are significantly less likely to prefer a system of universal health insurance 
even after controlling for symbolic beliefs and sociotropic perceptions.  Most models in 
the symbolic politics literature find that self-interest variables contribute very little 
compared to models including only symbolic belief variables (Lau 2007).   
The significant effect of self-interest in the symbolic politics model is likely due 
to the characteristics of the dependent variable.  First, it provides a tangible policy 
outcome for the uninsured.  Second, it provides a clear contrast to the current system 
which is not meeting the needs of the uninsured and is therefore likely to activate self-
                                                 
13
 The relevant Wald test statistics are: Democrats=Republicans (χ21df  = 37.35, p<.01)and 
liberals=conservatives (χ21df  = 18.18, p<.01). 
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interest.  The self-interest framework specifies that these types of characteristics, which 
exemplify the idea of tangible policy consequences, are necessary to activate self-interest.  
These features are often lacking in the dependent variable of traditional models of 
symbolic politics.      
The self-interest framework model provides a further improvement in explaining 
preferences for a system of universal health insurance14 and provides support for the 
expectations derived from the self-interest framework.  The first expectation of the 
framework is that self-interest will have an effect on policy preferences when the policy 
has tangible consequences.  To assess the overall effects of self-interest among 
individuals with a party affiliation, it is necessary to assess the coefficient on the insured 
variable together with the coefficients on the relevant interaction terms. I use a joint Wald 
test to evaluate the null hypothesis that self-interest has no effect (βinsured + βinsured x Democrat + 
βinsured x Republican = 0).  The test allows me to reject this hypothesis at P<.05.  
                                                 
14
 The log-likelihood for the symbolic politics model is -512.91 and reduces to -510.42 for the self-interest 
framework model (χ21df  = 4.98, p<.05). 
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Table 1: Symbolic Politics and Self-Interest Framework Models of Preference for Universal 
Coverage 
 Symbolic Politics 
Model 
Self-Interest 
Framework Model 
 Preference for 
Universal Coverage 
Preference for 
Universal Coverage 
Insured -1.327** -.959* 
 (0.352) (0.530) 
   
Uninsured Problem for Country 0.590** 0.590** 
 (0.112) (0.113) 
   
Democrat 0.434* 0.284 
 (0.190) (0.699) 
   
Republican -0.821** 0.789 
 (0.200) (0.935) 
   
Liberal 0.600** 0.589** 
 (0.212) (0.212) 
   
Conservative -0.410* -0.421* 
 (0.181) (0.182) 
   
Insured x Democrat -- 0.159 
  (0.724) 
   
Insured x Republican -- -1.686* 
  (0.952) 
   
Education 0.048 0.048 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
   
Age -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
   
White -0.092 -0.112 
 (0.204) (0.204) 
   
Income -0.093* -0.094* 
 (0.056) (0.057) 
   
Female -0.106 -0.113 
 (0.159) (0.160) 
   
Constant 0.244 -0.074 
 (0.641) (0.732) 
χ
2
 223.02 228.00 
Log-likelihood -512.91 -510.42 
N 917 917 
Note: Table entries are logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.   
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, one-tailed tests. 
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The coefficients show a significant, negative relationship of being insured to 
preferring a system of universal health insurance over the current system.  Figure 2 
demonstrates the effects of insurance status on preferences for universal coverage in the 
Self-interest Framework.  The predicted probability of supporting universal coverage for 
insured individuals is .58 (95% CI: .49-.66) and .79 (95% CI: 0.60-0.95) for uninsured 
individuals15.  This represents a 21 percentage point decrease in support as individuals 
move from being uninsured to having insurance.  These results provide support for the 
self-interest framework’s expectation that self-interest will have an effect on policy 
attitudes when the policy has tangible consequences.   
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Support for Universal Coverage Given Insurance 
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Of central interest in evaluating the self-interest framework is whether or not the 
effects of symbolic beliefs are moderated by self-interest.  The expectation of the self-
                                                 
 
15
 With the party, the party interaction terms, and ideology set to the modal value of zero, this represents the 
effect for moderate Independents.  Perceptions of the uninsured problem for the country and demographic 
variables are set to their mean or modal value.   
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interest framework, as depicted in Figure 1, is that Democrats will have similar 
preferences for universal coverage regardless of insurance status, while insured 
Republicans should express less support for universal coverage compared to uninsured 
Republicans and all Democrats.  These expectations are borne out in the non-significant 
coefficient on the interaction term for insurance status and Democrats as well as the 
negative and significant coefficient on the insurance status and Republican term.   
Again, to help with interpretation, the predicted probabilities for the interaction 
are presented in Figure 3.  There are two important features to notice.  First, there are no 
significant differences in preferences by party for self-interested individuals with a 
tangible stake in the policy outcome.  The probability of preferring universal coverage to 
the current system for uninsured Democrats is .89 (95% CI: .797-.992) and .84 (95% CI: 
.625-1.00) for uninsured Republicans16.  Second, insured Republicans, whose probability 
of supporting universal coverage is .27 (95% CI: .197-.337), are significantly different 
from uninsured Republicans and all Democrats.  These results provide initial support for 
the idea that self-interest serves to motivate individuals to carefully process information 
in the political environment such as party messages and potentially discount these 
messages when they conflict with self-interest.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Predicted probabilities for party affiliations are calculated by setting the main party affiliation term and 
party interaction term to one.  The liberal term is set to one for Democrats and the conservative term is set 
to one for Republicans.  The remaining variables are set to their modal or mean value.   
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Figure 3:  Predicted Probability of Support for Universal Coverage Given Insurance 
Status & Party Affiliation 
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 Although the data could not support the inclusion of an interaction between 
insurance status and sociotropic perceptions, it is still important to consider the 
consequences of including a main effect of sociotropic perceptions in models of self-
interest and symbolic beliefs.  As seen in Table 1, there is a significant and positive 
relationship between perceptions of the number of uninsured as a problem and 
preferences for universal health insurance.  Holding all other variables at their mean or 
modal value, moving from a perception that the number of uninsured is not a problem at 
all to the perception that it is a critical problem increases the probability of supporting 
universal coverage from .46-.83 for the uninsured and from .25-.66 for the insured.  
Because the interaction term could not be included in the model, Figure 4 shows the 
additive effect of being uninsured.  The uninsured tend to be about 20 percentage points 
more supportive of universal health care.   
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Figure 4:  Predicted Probability of Support for Universal Coverage Given Insurance 
Status & Sociotropic Perceptions 
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Discussion 
The results presented in the case of universal health insurance provide support for 
the self-interest framework.  The framework generates three predictions.  First, the effects 
of self-interest will be significant whenever the policy outcomes and consequences are 
clear.  The results support the hypothesis.  The provision of universal health insurance 
provides a tangible benefit to those individuals without health insurance.  Individuals 
currently lacking health insurance, those with a tangible interest in the policy, were 
significantly more likely to support the policy.  This effect persisted even when symbolic 
beliefs, such as party affiliation and ideology, and sociotropic perceptions of the 
uninsured problem were controlled for in the model.  The significant effect of self-
interest found in this analysis differs from the results found in much of the symbolic 
politics literature.  According to the self-interest framework, this discrepancy is explained 
by differences in the dependent variable.  In the present study, the dependent variable 
provides a policy choice between the status quo and a new system of health care in which 
all individuals have some form of health insurance.  This policy choice poses tangible 
benefits for the uninsured.  The dependent variable in the symbolic politics literature 
rarely has the same characteristics.  Under those conditions, when tangible policy effects 
are not clear to respondents, the self-interest framework would not predict significant 
effects for self-interest.      
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 Second, the self-interest framework predicts that self-interest will moderate the 
effects of sociotropic perceptions and symbolic beliefs.  The results presented in the case 
of universal health insurance preferences demonstrate significant differences between 
individuals without an interest in the policy based on party affiliation, and no such 
differences between those individuals with an interest in the policy.  As expected, the 
uninsured were equally as likely to support universal coverage regardless of party 
affiliation.  The self-interest framework posits that the uninsured are motivated to 
centrally process information in the political environment.  The data presented above 
provide evidence for the idea that Republicans without insurance were motivated to 
overcome the party message to support a system of universal health insurance over the 
current system.  Furthermore, the insured, those without a tangible interest in the policy, 
showed significant differences in support for universal coverage by party affiliation.  This 
suggests that party messages were processed peripherally as cues rather than elaborated 
upon centrally as arguments.  Although correlational in nature, these results provide 
support for the self-interest framework’s prediction that self-interest motivates 
individuals to centrally process symbolic political information, while those without an 
interest are likely to accept the symbolic political information as a peripheral cue.            
Finally, public policy attitudes formed by self-interested individuals should 
demonstrate the attributes of all attitudes formed using central route processing such as 
persistence and certainty.  The data utilized for testing the first two hypotheses are not 
capable of evaluating this expectation of the framework.  Future experimental work will 
be needed to evaluate the characteristics of attitudes resulting from both individuals 
lacking self-interest and those with self-interest in a public policy.  Additionally, the 
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survey data employed in this study were unable to accommodate testing the expectation 
that self-interest should moderate the effects of sociotropic perceptions.  Testing this 
expectation using survey data can potentially occur for policy areas where there is more 
variation among the self-interested on sociotropic conditions or through experimental 
manipulations.          
 
 
 
  
 
Conclusion 
The self-interest framework provides a new way of conceiving the role of self-
interest in politics.  Self-interest serves to motivate individuals to carefully process the 
information they receive from the political environment to form policy attitudes rather 
than simply relying on symbolic cues or perceptions of the national situation.  The 
framework provides insights into understanding the determinants of public policy 
attitudes.  In the aggregate, these attitudes function as inputs in the public policy process 
and serve as predictors of policy outcomes (Erikson et al. 2002).   
Additionally, the self-interest framework may have implications for political 
behavior.  The attitudes formed by self-interested individuals are predicted to be strong 
and therefore more predictive of behavior.  Scholars have begun to explore the idea that 
self-interest may have more of a political impact in terms of behavior than attitudes 
(William and Ratner 1998; and Green and Cowden 1992).  The self-interest framework 
would provide a theoretical rationale for these predictions.  Testing the behavioral impact 
of the framework would provide an even greater understanding of the subtle, but 
significant, role that self-interest plays in politics.         
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Appendix A:  Question Wordings 
 
* Kaiser Family Foundation and USA Today. ABC News/Kaiser/USA Today Poll # 
2006-1021: Health Care Costs and Issues [computer file]. 1st Roper Center for Public 
Opinion Research version. Storrs, CT: The Roper Center, University of Connecticut 
[distributor], 2006. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Which would you prefer – (the current health insurance system in the United States, in 
which most people get their health insurance from private employers, but some people 
have no insurance) or (a universal health insurance program, in which everyone is 
covered under a program like Medicare that’s run by the government and financed by 
taxpayers)? 
 
Self-Interest 
Do you have some form of health insurance or health care coverage, or not? 
 
Symbolic Beliefs 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: (A Democrat, A Republican, An 
Independent, Or What)? 
 
Would you say your views on most political matters are liberal, moderate, or 
conservative? 
 
Sociotropic Perceptions 
Thinking now about the number of Americans who have no health insurance – do you 
think that’s (a critical problem for the country, a serious problem but not a critical one, a 
problem but not serious, or not much of a problem at all)?   
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